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Although quantum key distribution (QKD) is theoretically secure, there is a gap between the
theory and practice. In fact, real-life QKD may not be secure because component devices in QKD
systems may deviate from the theoretical models assumed in security proofs. To solve this problem,
it is necessary to construct the security proof under realistic assumptions on the source and mea-
surement unit. In this paper, we prove the security of a QKD protocol under practical assumptions
on the source that accommodate fluctuation of the phase and intensity modulations. As long as our
assumptions hold, it does not matter at all how the phase and intensity distribute nor whether or
not their distributions over different pulses are independently and identically distributed (I.I.D.).
Our work shows that practical sources can be safely employed in QKD experiments.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] has attracted
much attention in recent years due to its potential to
achieve information-theoretically secure communication.
QKD enables two distant parties, Alice and Bob, to share
a secret key even under interventions by an eavesdrop-
per, Eve. So far, many groups have conducted the ex-
periments, including the field demonstrations [3–7]. Al-
though QKD is proven to be secure [8–16], QKD experi-
ments do not perfectly conform to the theoretical models
assumed in security proofs due to inevitable imperfec-
tions of realistic devices. As a result, Eve may exploit
the security loopholes that those imperfections open up
to learn the distributed key without being detected.
To solve this problem, it is necessary to generalize
the security proof and remove as many demanding as-
sumptions as possible on the component devices. For-
tunately, measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD
[17–19] closes any security loopholes on the photon-
detection side. Moreover, MDIQKD can be implemented
with current technologies, and the experimental demon-
strations have been reported [20]. If MDIQKD is widely
deployed, the attack must be focused on the source.
Therefore, it is important to prove the security of QKD
under realistic assumptions on the source in order to pre-
vent Eve’s hacking.
Some previous works analyzed the security based on
the source model that accommodates phase modulation
(PM) error, which is a commonly faced experimental
problem, and showed that the key rate decreases very
rapidly with the slight state preparation flaw and with
the increase of the channel losses [18, 21, 22]. This is be-
cause the PM error could lead to the leakage of basis in-
formation to Eve, which may allow her to perform basis-
dependent attacks. Recently, the problem was solved by
the loss-tolerant protocol [23], which employs the basis
mismatched events in estimating Eve’s information and
shows that the key rate is almost independent of the
slight PM error. The finite-key security analysis against
general attacks [24] and the experimental demonstrations
[25, 26] have been reported. The requirements in [23] are
that the single-photon part of each sending state lives
in the same qubit space (qubit assumption) and the PM
error is assumed to be independently and identically dis-
tributed (I.I.D.) over the different pulses. In addition,
the sending single-photon states are assumed to be ex-
actly known, i.e., the source is perfectly characterized.
In practice, however, due to inevitable imperfections of
experimental devices, the requirements are not always
fulfilled. For example, the distribution of the PM error
may gradually be drifting in time during the experiment.
Furthermore, the distributions over the different pulses
may be correlated with each other. In addition, it is diffi-
cult to precisely estimate the sending states with a finite
sample size. Therefore, it is crucial from practical view-
points to analyze the security of a QKD protocol under
these realistic situations.
In this paper, we solve these issues by proving the se-
curity of QKD under realistic assumptions on the source,
which relaxes assumptions in [23]. Our work is based on
the three-state QKD protocol with the qubit assumption
as well as the assumption that Alice knows the range in
which the phase of each prepared state lies with a certain
probability. As long as our assumptions hold, it does not
matter at all how the phase distributes nor whether or
not the distributions over different pulses are I.I.D. (non-
I.I.D. PM error). In addition, we also take into consider-
ation non-I.I.D. amplitude modulation (AM) error. The
effect of the AM error on the decoy-state method [27]
was studied in the recent work of [24], and we combine
the idea in [24] with our proof. It is worth mentioning
that the parameters of the source needed in our proof
can be estimated in practical experiments. We also per-
form simulations of the key generation rate to evaluate
the performance of a realistic fiber-based QKD system
based on our security proof. The results show that the
secure keys can be distributed over 100 km even under
simultaneous fluctuations of the phase (±5◦) and the in-
tensity (±5%), which indicates the feasibility of QKD
over long distances with practical light sources. There-
fore, our work is an important step towards a secure QKD
with realistic devices.
First, we describe the assumptions we make on the
devices for the security proof. We employ the prepare-
and-measure three-state protocol. We explain the as-
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2sumptions on Alice’s source followed by the ones of Bob’s
measurement apparatus.
Alice employs the phase encoding scheme and the
decoy-state method [27] with two types of decoy states
[28]. That is, she uses a phase modulator to encode bit
and basis information c ∈ C := {0Z , 1Z , 0X} on the rel-
ative phase between signal and reference pulses. Then,
she uses an amplitude modulator to encode the intensity
information k ∈ K := {s,d1,d2} on the total intensity
of the double pulses, where s, d1, and d2 denote a sig-
nal state and two decoy states, respectively. Note that
our security analysis applies as well to any other cod-
ing schemes and to any number of intensity settings. In
practice, the phase and the intensity fluctuate due to in-
evitable imperfections of the source. In addition, the in-
tensities of the signal and reference pulses are not always
the same. Here, we propose a device model that accom-
modates these imperfections. Let θ(i) ∈ {θ(i)0Z , θ
(i)
1Z
, θ
(i)
0X
},
µ(i) ∈ {µ(i)s , µ(i)d1 , µ(i)d2}, and γ(i)(> 0) denote the i-th
phase, intensity, and ratio of the intensity of the sig-
nal pulse to the one of the reference pulse, respectively
(i = 1, . . . , N). The assumptions on the source are as
follows.
A-1. Alice employs a perfectly phase-randomized coher-
ent light and the photon number of each pulse follows a
Poisson distribution.
A-2. Alice selects the setting c ∈ C and k ∈ K indepen-
dently at random.
A-3. For all c ∈ C, Alice knows the range [θ−c , θ+c ] which
satisfies Pr[θ−c ≤ θ(i)c ≤ θ+c ] ≥ 1 − δθ for all i, and
[θ−0Z , θ
+
0Z
], [θ−1Z , θ
+
1Z
], and [θ−0X , θ
+
0X
] do not overlap each
other.
A-4. For all k ∈ K, Alice knows the range [µ−k , µ+k ]
which satisfies Pr[µ−k ≤ µ(i)k ≤ µ+k ] ≥ 1− δµ for all i, and
1 ≥ µ+s , µ−d1 > µ+d2 ≥ 0, and µ−s > µ+d1 + µ−d2 are fulfilled.
A-5. The mode of the pulse is independent of the choice
of the setting c ∈ C and k ∈ K.
A-6. There are no side-channels.
Satisfying these assumptions, Alice’s sending state is
expressed as
ρˆ :=
〈
N⊗
i=1
∑
c∈C
∑
k∈K
pcpkPˆ
∣∣∣∣∣∣eiξ
√
µ
(i)
k
1 + γ(i)
〉
r
∣∣∣∣∣∣ei(ξ+θ(i)c )
√
γ(i)µ
(i)
k
1 + γ(i)
〉
s

〉
, (1)
where 〈 〉 represents an integration with weight of a joint
probability function of θ
(i)
c , µ
(i)
k , γ
(i) for all i, c ∈ C, and
k ∈ K. This integration is taken over all possible vari-
ables of θ
(i)
c , µ
(i)
k , and γ
(i). Here, pc (pk) is the probability
that Alice selects the setting c ∈ C (k ∈ K), ξ ∈ [0, 2pi)
is the random phase, |eiξ√α〉 is a coherent state with in-
tensity (mean photon number) α, the subscripts r and
s are used to denote the reference and signal modes, re-
spectively, and Pˆ (|·〉) := |·〉〈·|. Note that Eq. (1) covers
a situation that θ
(i)
c , µ
(i)
k , γ
(i) for all i, c ∈ C, and k ∈ K
have a classical correlation, and that it does not matter
how they distribute nor whether their distributions over
different trails are I.I.D. or not.
As for Bob, we make the following assumptions on the
measurement apparatus.
B-1. Bob chooses a measurement basis at random from
the Z and X bases.
B-2. The detection efficiency is independent of his basis
choice.
B-3. There are no side-channels.
Let {Mˆ0W ′ , Mˆ1W ′ , MˆØW ′} denote Bob’s positive oper-
ator valued measure (POVM) associated with his basis
choice W ′ ∈ {Z,X}, where Mˆ0W ′ (Mˆ1W ′ ) and MˆØW ′
correspond to the bit value 0 (1) and to an inconclu-
sive outcome, respectively. The POVM operators satisfy
Mˆ0W ′ + Mˆ1W ′ + MˆØW ′ = Iˆd, where Iˆd is the identity
operator. From B-2, MˆØZ = MˆØX is fulfilled [12].
Next, we describe our three-state protocol. The secret
key is extracted from the events where both Alice and
Bob have chosen the Z basis in the signal settings. The
protocol runs as follows.
0. Source characterization. Before starting the proto-
col, Alice characterizes her source to identify θ±c for all
c ∈ C, δθ, µ±k for all k ∈ K, and δµ.
1. Preparation. For each pulse, Alice randomly
chooses the basis W (i) ∈ {Z,X} with probabilities pZ
and pX = 1 − pZ , respectively, and the intensity set-
ting k(i) ∈ K = {s,d1,d2} with probabilities ps, pd1, and
pd2 := 1− ps − pd1, respectively. Then, she selects a bit
value a(i) ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random when W (i) = Z
while a(i) = 0 when W (i) = X, i.e., p0Z = p1Z = pZ/2
and p0X = pX . Finally, she prepares the pulses in the
state based on the chosen settings and sends it to Bob
over a quantum channel.
2. Measurement. For each incoming pulse, Bob ran-
domly chooses the measurement basis W ′(i) ∈ {Z,X}.
Then he performs a measurement in the W ′(i) basis and
records the outcome b(i) ∈ {0, 1,Ø}. In practice, the
measurement device is usually implemented with two
single-photon detectors. In this case, the measurement
has four possible outcomes {0, 1,Ø,⊥}, which correspond
to the bit values 0, 1, no detection, and double detection,
respectively. For the first three outcomes, Bob assigns
3what he observes to b(i), and for the last outcome ⊥ he
assigns a random bit value to b(i).
3. Basis reconciliation. After repeating the steps 1-
2 N times, Alice announces θ±c for all c ∈ C, δθ, µ±k
for all k ∈ K, δµ, her basis choices, and intensity set-
tings while Bob announces his basis choices and those
instances with the detection events, over an authenti-
cated public channel. Then, they also announce their bit
values for the events where Bob has chosen the X basis.
With these information, they identify the following sets:
SZ,Z,k := {i|W (i) = W ′(i) = Z ∧ k(i) = k} for all k ∈ K,
SZ,Z,k,det := {i|W (i) = W ′(i) = Z ∧ k(i) = k ∧ b(i) 6= Ø}
for all k ∈ K, Sc,X,k := {i|a(i)W (i) = c∧W ′(i) = X ∧ k(i) =
k} for all c ∈ C and k ∈ K, and Sc,bX ,k := {i|a(i)W (i) =
c ∧W ′(i) = X ∧ k(i) = k ∧ b(i) = b} for all c ∈ C, k ∈ K,
and b ∈ {0, 1}.
4. Generation of sifted key and parameter estima-
tion. A sifted key pair (ZA, ZB) is generated by choos-
ing a random sample of SZ,Z,s,det, while the rest of
SZ,Z,s,det is used to estimate the bit error rate eZ . Then,
they calculate the gain in the Z basis Qdet|Z,Z,k :=
|SZ,Z,k,det|/|SZ,Z,k| for all k ∈ K, which is the frac-
tion of the number of the detection events given the
setting {W = W ′ = Z ∧ k ∈ K}. Here, | ∗ | de-
notes the length of the set ∗. Next, they compute
Qb|c,X,k := |Sc,bX ,k|/|Sc,X,k| for all c ∈ C, k ∈ K,
and b ∈ {0, 1}, which is the fraction of the number of
the events where Bob has obtained b given the setting
{c ∈ C ∧W ′ = X ∧ k ∈ K}. With these experimentally
available data, they use the decoy-state method to cal-
culate the single-photon contribution to Qdet|Z,Z,k and
Qb|c,X,k. Finally, by using the single-photon part of the
data, they calculate the upper bound on the phase error
rate of single-photon states [Eq. (11)] in (ZA, ZB).
5. Postprocessing. Alice and Bob perform error cor-
rection followed by privacy amplification on (ZA, ZB) to
generate a secret key.
Now, we show the protocol is secure against coherent
attacks. In order to generate a secret key from the sifted
bits, Alice and Bob have to estimate the min-entropy of
the single-photon part, which quantifies the amount of
information leaked to Eve [13, 14]. For this, we employ
the phase error rate of the single-photon part [12, 16]
that is related to the min-entropy. Given the proper es-
timation of the rate, we can generate a secret key by
performing privacy amplification based on the estimated
phase error rate. Note that for simplicity, we study the
asymptotic scenario, where the number of emitted pulses
N is infinite.
For the estimation of the phase error rate, we consider
the worst case, in which sending states are regarded as
the so-called tagged states unless both θ−c ≤ θ(i)c ≤ θ+c
and µ−k ≤ µ(i)k ≤ µ+k are simultaneously satisfied. The
tag tells Eve the bit and basis information of the state,
and therefore she can learn perfect information on those
instances without causing any errors. It is convenient
to introduce a probability pt := 1 − (1 − δθ)(1 − δµ),
which is the probability of the sending state being tagged.
We pessimistically assume that the binary entropy of the
phase error rate of the tagged single-photon states is 1
due to the worst case scenario. Therefore, the secret key
generation rate R (per pulse) is lower bounded by
R ≥ p2Zps{Qu,1,det|Z,Z,s (1− h(eX,s,u,1))
−Qdet|Z,Z,sfECh(eZ)}, (2)
whenever the right-hand side is positive [21]. Here,
Qu,1,det|Z,Z,s is a fraction of Qdet|Z,Z,s that originates
from the untagged single-photon states, eX,s,u,1 is the
phase error rate of the untagged single-photon states in
the signal settings, fEC is the efficiency of the error cor-
recting code, and h(x) is the binary entropy function. In
the following, we give the definition of eX,s,u,1. Then, we
describe the way to estimate the upper bound on eX,s,u,1
from the experimentally available data in the protocol.
For simplicity, we first consider the case where γ(i) = 1
for all i, i.e., the intensities of double pulses are always
the same. The general case where γ(i) 6= 1 is described in
Appendix A. According to Eq. (1), the untagged single-
photon part prepared in the signal settings is expressed
as
ρˆs,u,1 =
〈
Ns,u,1⊗
i=1
∑
c∈C
pcPˆ (|θ(i)c 〉)
〉
, (3)
where Ns,u,1 is the number of events where Alice has
emitted untagged single-photon states in the signal set-
tings, and the interval of integration with respect to θ
(i)
c is
[θ−c , θ
+
c ]. Here, we define a qubit state as |θ〉 := (|1〉r|0〉s+
eiθ|0〉r|1〉s)/
√
2, where |n〉r(s) denotes n-photon state of
reference (signal) pulse, and the set of two pure states
{|1〉r|0〉s, |0〉r|1〉s} forms a qubit basis. In what follows,
the eigenstates in the Y basis are defined as |0Y 〉 :=
|1〉r|0〉s and |1Y 〉 := |0〉r|1〉s, and the ones in the Z
(X) basis are |0Z〉 := (|0Y 〉 + |1Y 〉)/
√
2 and |1Z〉 :=
(−i|0Y 〉+i|1Y 〉)/
√
2 (|aX〉 := (|0Z〉+(−1)a|1Z〉)/
√
2 with
a ∈ {0, 1}).
The emission of the Z- (X-) basis states can be
equivalently described as follows. Alice first pre-
pares |ψ(i)Z 〉AB = 1√2
∑
a=0,1 |aZ〉A|θ(i)aZ 〉B (|ψ(i)X 〉AB =
|0X〉A|θ(i)0X 〉). Then, she measures the system A in the
Z (X) basis before sending Bob only system B. In or-
der to define the phase error rate, we convert the actual
protocol into the virtual one in such a way that it is
equivalent from Eve’s perspective. In the virtual proto-
col (we refer Appendix A of [23] and Appendix D of [24]
for detailed explanations), Alice and Bob measure sys-
tems A and B in the X basis (complementary basis to
the Z basis) given the preparation of |ψ(i)Z 〉AB . In these
virtual events, Alice sends out |θ(i)avir〉B with a probability
4p
(i)
avir , which are respectively written as
Pˆ (|θ(i)avir〉) = TrA
[
Pˆ (|aX〉A)Pˆ (|ψ(i)Z 〉AB)
]
/p(i)avir
=
{
Pˆ (|(θ(i)0Z + θ
(i)
1Z
)/2〉) (a = 0)
Pˆ (|(θ(i)0Z + θ
(i)
1Z
)/2 + pi〉) (a = 1), (4)
and
p(i)avir = Tr
[
Pˆ (|aX〉A)Pˆ (|ψ(i)Z 〉AB)
]
=
1
2
(
1 + (−1)a cos
(
θ
(i)
0Z
− θ(i)1Z
2
))
, (5)
where TrA denotes the partial trace over system A. In
the virtual protocol, Alice first prepares
ρˆAB =
〈
Ns,u,1⊗
i=1
Pˆ
 5∑
j=1
√
p
(i)
j |j〉A|ψ(i)j 〉B
〉 , (6)
where p
(i)
1 = p
2
Zp
(i)
0vir
, p
(i)
2 = p
2
Zp
(i)
1vir
, p
(i)
3 = p
(i)
4 =
pZpX/2, p
(i)
5 = pX , |ψ(i)1 〉 = |θ(i)0vir〉, |ψ
(i)
2 〉 = |θ(i)1vir〉,
|ψ(i)3 〉 = |θ(i)0Z 〉, |ψ
(i)
4 〉 = |θ(i)1Z 〉, and |ψ
(i)
5 〉 = |θ(i)0X 〉.
Then, she sends system B to Bob before they perform
a collective measurement characterized by the POVM
Fˆj′,b with j
′ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 6} and b ∈ {0, 1,Ø}, where
Fˆj′,b = Pˆ (|j′〉A) ⊗ MˆbX ,B for j′ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, Fˆ5,b =
Pˆ (|5〉A) ⊗ pXMˆbX ,B , and Fˆ6,b = Pˆ (|5〉A) ⊗ pZMˆbZ ,B .
The reason why we can introduce ρˆAB in Eq. (6) is that
Eve’s accessible quantum information to the sending sys-
tem B is the same as the one in the actual protocol, i.e.,
TrA[ρˆAB ] = ρˆs,u,1 is satisfied. From this, we can com-
pute the probability of obtaining j′ and b in the i-th
trial, which depends on the previous outcomes. Thus,
by taking the summation of such probabilities over i
(i = 1, . . . , Ns,u,1), Azuma’s inequality [29] gives the ac-
tual occurrence number of such events [23, 24, 30, 31].
Consequently, the fraction of the number of events where
Alice and Bob obtain a and b, respectively, given that Al-
ice sends untagged virtual state (j′=1 or 2), Ya,b|vir,u, and
the fraction of the number of events where Bob obtains
b given that Alice sends untagged single-photon states
under the setting {c ∈ C ∧W ′ = X}, Yb|c,X,u,1, are re-
spectively given by
Ya,b|vir,u =
1
Ns,u,1
Ns,u,1∑
i=1
〈
p(i)avirTr
[
Dˆ
(i)
bX
Pˆ (|θ(i)avir〉)
]〉
, (7)
and
Yb|c,X,u,1 =
1
Ns,u,1
Ns,u,1∑
i=1
〈
Tr
[
Dˆ
(i)
bX
Pˆ (|θ(i)c 〉)
]〉
, (8)
where Dˆ
(i)
bX
is an arbitrary operator including Eve’s op-
eration and Bob’s i-th X-basis measurement with the
outcome b.
Thus, eX,s,u,1 is defined as
eX,s,u,1 :=
Y0,1|vir,u + Y1,0|vir,u
Y0,0|vir,u + Y0,1|vir,u + Y1,0|vir,u + Y1,1|vir,u
=
Y0,1|vir,u + Y1,0|vir,u
Ydet|Z,Z,u,1
, (9)
where Ydet|Z,Z,u,1 is the yield of untagged single-photon
states in the Z basis, i.e., the fraction of the detection
events given that Alice has sent out untagged single-
photon states under the setting {W = W ′ = Z}. Note
that Ya,b|vir,u, Yb|c,X,u,1, and Ydet|Z,Z,u,1 do not depend
on the intensity setting k ∈ K because Eve cannot dis-
tinguish the decoy states from the signal states and the
only information available to Eve is the number of pho-
tons in a sending state [27]. In the second equality of Eq.
(9), we have used the assumption B-2 in Sec. II.
In what follows, we provide the way to estimate the
upper bound on the phase error rate eX,s,u,1 from the
experimentally available data. Note that the denomi-
nator in Eq. (9), Ydet|Z,Z,u,1, can be lower bounded by
the decoy-state method [Eq. (B2)], and as a result, the
lower bound Y −det|Z,Z,u,1 can be directly calculated by us-
ing experimentally available data [24]. The next step is
to estimate the upper bound on Ya,b|vir,u, which is the
numerator in Eq. (9). The upper bound is given by
Ya,b|vir,u ≤ p+avir
∑
c∈C
g+a,cYb|c,X,u,1, (10)
where p+avir is the maximum value of p
(i)
avir in Eq. (5) under
the constraint of θ−c ≤ θ(i)c ≤ θ+c . The derivation of Eq.
(10) and the definition of g+a,c are described in Appendix
C. Note that p+avir and g
+
a,c can be calculated.
Finally, we obtain the upper bound on Ya,b|vir,u as fol-
lows. From the decoy state method [24], we estimate
Y −b|c,X,u,1 and Y
+
b|c,X,u,1, which are the lower and upper
bound on Yb|c,X,u,1, respectively [Eqs. (B6), (B8)]. When
g+a,c is positive (negative), we replace Yb|c,X,u,1 in Eq. (10)
with Y +b|c,X,u,1 (Y
−
b|c,X,u,1) to obtain the upper bound on
Ya,b|vir,u, which we denote by Y
+
a,b|vir,u. With this way,
we have the upper bound on the phase error rate as
eX,s,u,1 ≤ e+X,s,u,1 =
Y +0,1|vir,u + Y
+
1,0|vir,u
Y −det|Z,Z,u,1
, (11)
which can be calculated by using the experimentally
available data.
In the following, we present the simulation results for
our three-state protocol with non-I.I.D. light sources. We
consider two types of simulations. In the first simulation,
in order to see the effect of the non-I.I.D. PM error, we
assume that Alice possesses the single-photon source with
the PM error. In the second simulation, she is assumed
to use the coherent source with both the non-I.I.D. PM
and AM errors.
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Secret key generation rate (per pulse)
vs fiber length for the first simulation. The key rates are
plotted in logarithmic scale for θ = 0◦, 1◦, 3◦, 5◦, 7◦, 9◦ (from
right to left).
We begin with the description of the model of the PM
error. We assume that θ
(1)
c , . . . , θ
(N)
c are I.I.D. and follow
the same Gaussian distribution which has a mean of θ¯c
and a standard deviation of θ/5.33, so that the phase
fluctuates at most ±θ, i.e., [θ−c , θ+c ] = [θ¯c − θ, θ¯c + θ] and
δθ = 10
−7 are satisfied. Here, θ¯0Z = 0, θ¯1Z = pi, and
θ¯0X = pi/2. These I.I.D. properties are assumed only to
obtain the parameters Qdet|Z,Z,k and Qb|c,X,k, which are
measured in the actual experiments. We emphasize that
Alice does not know these I.I.D. properties, and we apply
the analysis assuming non-I.I.D. sources.
The assumed system parameters are as follows. We
consider a fiber-based QKD system with an attenuation
coefficient 0.2 dB/km. That is, the channel transmit-
tance is ηch = 10
−0.2l/10, where l is the fiber length. Bob
uses a measurement setup with two single photon detec-
tors: they have the detection efficiency of ηB = 0.15 and
the dark count rate of pd = 5 × 10−7. Also, the effi-
ciency of the error correcting code is fEC = 1.22, and the
Z basis (signal settings) is selected with the probability
pZ = 2/3 (ps = 1/3). For simplicity, we do not consider
the misalignment of the detector at Bob’s side.
FIG. 1 shows the resulting secret key generation rate
R (per pulse) as a function of the fiber length for the
first simulation (see also Appendix D). The key rates are
plotted in logarithmic scale for θ = 0◦, 1◦, 3◦, 5◦, 7◦, 9◦,
which reflects the accuracy of the phase modulator.
In the second simulation, we assume that µ
(1)
k , . . . , µ
(N)
k
are also I.I.D. and follow the same Gaussian distribu-
tion which has a mean of µ¯k and a standard deviation
of (µ+k − µ¯k)/5.33, so that δµ = 10−7 is satisfied. The
intensity is assumed to fluctuate at most x%. That
is, µ±k = (1 ± 0.01x)µ¯k. For the evaluation, we nu-
merically optimize the key rate R over {µ¯s, µ¯d1}. Note
that we fix the intensity of the weakest decoy state to
µ¯d2 = 2 × 10−4. FIG. 2 shows the result for (θ, x) =
(0◦, 0), (1◦, 1), (3◦, 3), (5◦, 5), (7◦, 7), which reflect the ac-
curacy of the phase and amplitude modulator, respec-
tively (see also Appendix D). From these results, we see
that the key can still be generated over long distances,
which indicates the feasibility of QKD in the presence
of high channel loss. Note that the result in FIG. 2 can
be improved with a better analysis of the decoy-state
method under intensity fluctuations.
In conclusion, we have proved the security of a QKD
protocol under the practical situation where users have
limited control over the phase, the intensity, and the ra-
tio of the intensity of the signal pulse to the one of the
reference pulse. As long as our assumptions hold, it does
not matter how they distribute nor whether their distri-
butions are I.I.D. or not. Based on our security analysis,
we have made simulations for the key generation rate,
which shows a secret key can be securely distributed over
long distances with imperfect source devices. We believe
that our work is an important step to construct a truly
secure QKD with realistic devices.
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Secret key generation rate (per pulse)
vs fiber length for the second simulation. Numerically op-
timized secret key rates (in logarithmic scale) are obtained
for (θ, x) = (0◦, 0), (1◦, 1), (3◦, 3), (5◦, 5), (7◦, 7) (from right to
left).
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Appendix A: The case where the intensities of the
signal and reference pulses are different
In this appendix, we generalize the security proof in
the main text to the case where the intensities of the
signal and reference pulses are different. That is, the
ratio of the intensity of the signal pulse to the one of the
reference pulse γ(i) 6= 1. Here, we show that, even in this
case, the upper bound on the phase error rate is the same
as the one in the main text [Eq. (11)], where we assume
γ(i) = 1.
According to Eq. (1), given the setting c ∈ C, the
prepared untagged single-photon state is a classical mix-
ture of a qubit state |θ(i)c , φ(i)〉 := cos(φ(i)/2)|0Y 〉 +
eiθ
(i)
c sin(φ(i)/2)|1Y 〉 with θ−c ≤ θ(i)c ≤ θ+c and 0 < φ(i) <
pi, where φ(i) := 2 tan−1
√
γ(i). Now, we introduce a fil-
ter operation whose successful operation is given by Fˆ :=
qPˆ (|0Y 〉) + (1− q)Pˆ (|1Y 〉), with 0 ≤ q ≤ 1 and q 6= 1/2.
This operation uniformly lifts up all the states on the
X-Z plane of the Bloch sphere and transforms a state ρˆ
with Bloch vector {x, 0, z} to the state Fˆ ρˆFˆ †/p, whose
Bloch vector is {f(q)x, (2q − 1)/(1 − 2q + 2q2), f(q)z}
with f(q) := 2(1 − q)q/(1 − 2q + 2q2). Here, p :=
q2 − q + 1/2 is the success probability of the filtering
operation which is the same for all the states on the
X-Z plane. Applying this filter to Pˆ (|θ(i)c , pi/2〉), whose
Bloch vector is {sin θ(i)c , 0, cos θ(i)c }, for all c ∈ C, one
obtains Pˆ (|θ(i)c , φ(i)〉) = Fˆ Pˆ (|θ(i)c , pi/2〉)Fˆ †/p with Bloch
vector {sinφ(i) sin θ(i)c , cosφ(i), sinφ(i) cos θ(i)c } when the
relation of tanφ(i) = (2q−2q2)/(2q−1) holds. From this,
we can rewrite the transmission rate of the actual states
as Tr[Dˆ′
(i)
bX Pˆ (|θ(i)c , pi/2〉)], where Dˆ′
(i)
bX := Fˆ
†Dˆ(i)bX Fˆ /p.
Importantly, Dˆ′
(i)
bX is independent of c. This means that
even if Alice sends |θ(i)c , φ(i)〉 in reality, we are allowed to
convert the problem with φ(i) 6= pi/2 (γ(i) 6= 1) to the
case where φ(i) = pi/2 (γ(i) = 1). This is because the
proof with γ(i) = 1 is valid for any operator Dˆ
(i)
bX
[23].
Appendix B: DECOY-STATE ANALYSIS
In this appendix, we show how the decoy-state method
is used to derive the security bounds presented in the
main text, namely, the lower bound on Ydet|Z,Z,u,1 and
the lower and upper bound on Yb|c,X,u,1. The derivation
is based on the previous work of [24], which generalizes
the idea of one-signal and two-decoy method [28] to the
case where the intensity of each pulse fluctuates and it
lies within [µ−k , µ
+
k ].
Applying the method of [24] to our work, Ydet|Z,Z,u,1
can be lower bounded by a function of Qdet|Z,Z,k,u with
k ∈ K, which is the fraction of the number of the de-
7tection events given that Alice has sent the untagged
states under the setting {W = W ′ = Z ∧ k ∈ K}. Since
Qdet|Z,Z,k,u cannot be directly obtained in the experi-
ments, we consider to bound it by Qdet|Z,Z,k, which is an
experimentally available data in the protocol. Eve may
control the detection efficiency of the tagged states at
Bob’s side, and therefore, the following condition gener-
ally holds:
Qdet|Z,Z,k − pt
1− pt ≤ Qdet|Z,Z,k,u ≤
Qdet|Z,Z,k
1− pt , (B1)
where the equality holds for the first inequality if and
only if Eve makes all the tagged states detected at Bob’s
side, while the equality for the second one holds if and
only if Eve blocks all the tagged states. By combining
the bounds given in [24] and Eq. (B1), we obtain the
lower bound on Ydet|Z,Z,u,1 as
Ydet|Z,Z,u,1 ≥ Y −det|Z,Z,u,1 =
µ−s
(µ−s − µ+d1 − µ−d2)(µ+d1 − µ−d2)
×
{ (Qdet|Z,Z,d1 − pt)eµ−d1 −Qdet|Z,Z,d2eµ+d2
1− pt
− (µ
+
d1)
2 − (µ−d2)2
(µ−s )2
(Qdet|Z,Z,seµ+s
1− pt − Y
−
det|Z,Z,u,0
)}
,
(B2)
where Y −det|Z,Z,u,0 is the lower bound on the yield of un-
tagged vacuum states in the Z basis, which is given by
Y −det|Z,Z,u,0 =
max
{µ−d1(Qdet|Z,Z,d2 − pt)eµ−d2 − µ+d2Qdet|Z,Z,d1eµ+d1
(1− pt)(µ−d1 − µ+d2)
, 0
}
.
(B3)
In addition, Qu,1,det|Z,Z,s in Eq. (2) is lower bounded by
Qu,1,det|Z,Z,s ≥ Q−u,1,det|Z,Z,s = (1−pt)µ−s e−µ
−
s Y −det|Z,Z,u,1,
(B4)
where µ−s e
−µ−s is the lower bound on the probability of
a signal pulse becoming a single-photon state.
Similarly, Yb|c,X,u,1 can be lower bounded by a function
of Qb|c,X,k,u with k ∈ K, which is the fraction of the
number of the events where Bob has obtained b given
that Alice has sent the untagged states under the setting
{c ∈ C ∧W ′ = X ∧ k ∈ K}. Similar to Eq. (B1), we have
the following general condition:
Qb|c,X,k − pt
1− pt ≤ Qb|c,X,k,u ≤
Qb|c,X,k
1− pt . (B5)
Combining the bounds given in [24] and Eq. (B5), we
obtain the lower and upper bound on Yb|c,X,u,1 as
Yb|c,X,u,1 ≥ Y −b|c,X,u,1 =
µ−s
(µ−s − µ+d1 − µ−d2)(µ+d1 − µ−d2)
×
{ (Qb|c,X,d1 − pt)eµ−d1 −Qb|c,X,d2eµ+d2
1− pt
− (µ
+
d1)
2 − (µ−d2)2
(µ−s )2
(Qb|c,X,seµ+s
1− pt − Y
−
b|c,X,u,0
)}
, (B6)
where Y −b|c,X,u,0 is the lower bound on Yb|c,X,u,0, which
is the fraction of the number of events where Bob has
obtained b given that Alice has sent the untagged vacuum
states under the setting {c ∈ C ∧W ′ = X}. This is given
by
Y −b|c,X,u,0 =
max
{µ−d1(Qb|c,X,d2 − pt)eµ−d2 − µ+d2Qb|c,X,d1eµ+d1
(1− pt)(µ−d1 − µ+d2)
, 0
}
.
(B7)
In addition, Yb|c,X,u,1 is upper bounded by
Yb|c,X,u,1 ≤ Y +b|c,X,u,1
=
Qb|c,X,d1eµ
+
d1 − (Qb|c,X,d2 − pt)eµ
−
d2
(1− pt)(µ−d1 − µ+d2)
. (B8)
Appendix C: Upper bound on Ya,b|vir,u
In this appendix, we present the derivation of Ya,b|vir,u
in Eq. (10) in the main text. As Pˆ (|θ〉) is written as
Pˆ (|θ〉) = (Iˆd + sin θXˆ + cos θZˆ)/2 by using Pauli opera-
tors, we obtain
Tr[Dˆ
(i)
bX
Pˆ (|θ(i)0Z 〉)]
Tr[Dˆ
(i)
bX
Pˆ (|θ(i)1Z 〉)]
Tr[Dˆ
(i)
bX
Pˆ (|θ(i)0X 〉)]
 = M (i)
Tr[Dˆ
(i)
bX
Iˆd/2]
Tr[Dˆ
(i)
bX
Xˆ/2]
Tr[Dˆ
(i)
bX
Zˆ/2]
 , (C1)
where M (i) := (~V0Z ,
~V1Z ,
~V0X )
T with ~V Tc :=
(1, sin θ
(i)
c , cos θ
(i)
c ), with T representing the transpose.
Since the Bloch vectors of Pˆ (|θ(i)0Z 〉), Pˆ (|θ
(i)
1Z
〉), and
Pˆ (|θ(i)0X 〉) form a triangle (from the assumption A-3),
rankM (i) = 3 is satisfied, which means there always
exists the inverse of M (i). Therefore, according to Eq.
(C1), we can obtain the transmission rate of Pauli ma-
trices Tr[Dˆ
(i)
bX
Iˆd/2], Tr[Dˆ
(i)
bX
Xˆ/2], and Tr[Dˆ
(i)
bX
Zˆ/2] from
the ones of actually sending states. Combining this fact
8with Eqs. (7) and (8), we have
Ya,b|vir,u ≤ p+avir
1
Ns,u,1
Ns,u,1∑
i=1
〈
Tr
[
Dˆ
(i)
bX
Pˆ (|θ(i)avir〉)
]〉
= p+avir
1
Ns,u,1
Ns,u,1∑
i=1
〈
Tr
[
Dˆ
(i)
bX
Iˆd/2
]
+ sin θ(i)avirTr
[
Dˆ
(i)
bX
Xˆ/2
]
+ cos θ(i)avirTr
[
Dˆ
(i)
bX
Zˆ/2
] 〉
= p+avir
1
Ns,u,1
Ns,u,1∑
i=1
∑
c∈C
〈
g(i)a,cTr
[
Dˆ
(i)
bX
Pˆ (|θ(i)c 〉)
]〉
≤ p+avir
1
Ns,u,1
Ns,u,1∑
i=1
∑
c∈C
g+a,c
〈
Tr
[
Dˆ
(i)
bX
Pˆ (|θ(i)c 〉)
]〉
= p+avir
∑
c∈C
g+a,cYb|c,X,u,1, (C2)
where p+avir is the maximum value of p
(i)
avir under the con-
straint of θ−c ≤ θ(i)c ≤ θ+c . Here, g(i)a,c and g+a,c with
a ∈ {0, 1} and c ∈ C in Eq. (C2) is a function of θ(i)0Z ,
θ
(i)
1Z
, and θ
(i)
0X
, and its upper bound under the condition
of θ−c ≤ θ(i)c ≤ θ+c , respectively. g(i)a,c is a parameter that
connects the transmission rate of Pauli matrices to that
of actual states.
In what follows, we show the derivation of p+avir for all
a ∈ {0, 1}, the explicit formula of g(i)a,c, and the way to
derive g+a,c for all a ∈ {0, 1} and c ∈ C. The derivation
of these upper bounds depends on the range [θ−c , θ
+
c ],
which Alice identifies during the experiments. Here, as
an example, we consider a special case that we consider
in our simulation. That is, the following conditions are
satisfied:
−θ ≤ θ(i)0Z ≤ θ,
pi − θ ≤ θ(i)1Z ≤ pi + θ,
pi/2− θ ≤ θ(i)0X ≤ pi/2 + θ. (C3)
In the following, we begin with deriving p+avir . Then we
show the way to obtain g+a,c. Note that, θ, which reflects
the accuracy of the phase modulator, is less than 10◦ in
our simulation, and we use this fact in the following cal-
culation. Also, note that our method can be generalized
for any [θ−c , θ
+
c ].
Computation of p+avir – We apply Eq. (C3) to Eq.
(5), obtaining
p
(i)
0vir
=
1
2
(
1 + cos
(
θ
(i)
0Z
− θ(i)1Z
2
))
≤ 1
2
(1 + sin θ) = p+0vir , (C4)
and
p
(i)
1vir
=
1
2
(
1− cos
(
θ
(i)
0Z
− θ(i)1Z
2
))
≤ 1
2
(1 + sin θ) = p+1vir , (C5)
where we have used the fact that −pi/2 − θ ≤ (θ(i)0Z −
θ
(i)
1Z
)/2 ≤ −pi/2 + θ .
Computation of g+a,c – g
(i)
a,c with a ∈ {0, 1} and c ∈ C
can be written as a function of u
(i)
a,c(θ
(i)
0Z
, θ
(i)
1Z
, θ
(i)
0X
) and
v
(i)
a,c(θ
(i)
0Z
, θ
(i)
1Z
, θ
(i)
0X
), which are defined later. First, we find
the range of u
(i)
a,c and v
(i)
a,c under Eq. (C3). Then, we com-
pute the partial derivative of g
(i)
a,c with respect to u
(i)
a,c and
v
(i)
a,c, and check whether the signs of these partial deriva-
tives are positive or not. Finally, by using these signs,
we identify the values of u
(i)
a,c and v
(i)
a,c that maximize g
(i)
a,c
to obtain g+a,c. Note that this upper bound is not the
maximum value of g
(i)
a,c under Eq. (C3) because we re-
gard u
(i)
a,c and v
(i)
a,c as individual variables although this
is not the case. Indeed, the upper bound is certainly
greater than or equal to the maximum value. Therefore,
we successfully estimate the upper bound on g
(i)
a,c. In the
following, we concisely summarize the formulas of g
(i)
a,c,
and the upper bounds:
• g(i)0,0Z =
u
(i)
0,0Z
u
(i)
0,0Z
− v(i)0,0Z
≤ sin θ
sin θ + cos 32θ
= g+0,0Z , (C6)
where u
(i)
0,0Z
:= sin ((θ
(i)
0Z
+ θ
(i)
1Z
− 2θ(i)0X )/4) and v
(i)
0,0Z
:=
sin ((−3θ(i)0Z + θ
(i)
1Z
+ 2θ
(i)
0X
)/4). Due to Eq. (C3), we have
− sin θ ≤ u(i)0,0Z ≤ sin θ and cos 32θ ≤ v
(i)
0,0Z
≤ 1.
• g(i)0,1Z =
u
(i)
0,1Z
u
(i)
0,1Z
+ v
(i)
0,1Z
≤ sin θ
sin θ + cos 32θ
= g+0,1Z , (C7)
where u
(i)
0,1Z
:= sin ((θ
(i)
0Z
+ θ
(i)
1Z
− 2θ(i)0X )/4) and v
(i)
0,1Z
:=
sin ((−θ(i)0Z + 3θ
(i)
1Z
− 2θ(i)0X )/4). Due to Eq. (C3), we have
− sin θ ≤ u(i)0,1Z ≤ sin θ and cos 32θ ≤ v
(i)
0,1Z
≤ 1.
• g(i)0,0X =
1− u(i)0,0X
v
(i)
0,0X
− u(i)0,0X
≤ 1− sin θ
cos 2θ − sin θ = g
+
0,0X
, (C8)
where u
(i)
0,0X
:= cos ((θ
(i)
0Z
− θ(i)1Z )/2) and v
(i)
0,0X
:=
cos ((θ
(i)
0Z
+ θ
(i)
1Z
− 2θ(i)0X )/2). Due to Eq. (C3), we have
− sin θ ≤ u(i)0,0X ≤ sin θ and cos 2θ ≤ v
(i)
0,0X
≤ 1.
• g(i)1,0Z =
u
(i)
1,0Z
u
(i)
1,0Z
− v(i)1,0Z
≤ cos θ
cos θ − sin 32θ
= g+1,0Z , (C9)
9where u
(i)
1,0Z
:= cos ((θ
(i)
0Z
+ θ
(i)
1Z
− 2θ(i)0X )/4) and v
(i)
1,0Z
:=
cos ((−3θ(i)0Z + θ
(i)
1Z
+ 2θ
(i)
0X
)/4). Due to Eq. (C3), we have
cos θ ≤ u(i)1,0Z ≤ 1 and − sin 32θ ≤ v
(i)
1,0Z
≤ sin 32θ.
• g(i)1,1Z =
u
(i)
1,1Z
u
(i)
1,1Z
− v(i)1,1Z
≤ cos θ
cos θ − sin 32θ
= g+1,1Z , (C10)
where u
(i)
1,1Z
:= cos ((θ
(i)
0Z
+ θ
(i)
1Z
− 2θ(i)0X )/4) and v
(i)
1,1Z
:=
cos ((−θ(i)0Z + 3θ
(i)
1Z
− 2θ(i)0X )/4). Due to Eq. (C3), we have
cos θ ≤ u(i)1,1Z ≤ 1 and − sin 32θ ≤ v
(i)
1,1Z
≤ sin 32θ.
• g(i)1,0X =
−1− u(i)1,0X
v
(i)
1,0X
− u(i)1,0X
≤ −1− sin θ
1 + sin θ
= g+1,0X , (C11)
where u
(i)
1,0X
:= cos ((θ
(i)
0Z
− θ(i)1Z )/2) and v
(i)
1,0X
:=
cos ((θ
(i)
0Z
+ θ
(i)
1Z
− 2θ(i)0X )/2). Due to Eq. (C3), we have
− sin θ ≤ u(i)1,0X ≤ sin θ and cos 2θ ≤ v
(i)
1,0X
≤ 1.
Appendix D: Detail of the simulation
In this appendix, we present the calculations used to
obtain FIGs. 1 and 2 in the main text. Specifically, we
show how to simulate the parameters that are measured
in the experiments. In both simulations, θ
(1)
c , . . . , θ
(N)
c
are I.I.D. and follow the same Gaussian distribution
which has a mean of θ¯c and a standard deviation of
θ/5.33, so that δθ = 10
−7 is satisfied. Here, θ¯0Z = 0,
θ¯1Z = pi, and θ¯0X = pi/2. In this case, the sending
single-photon state is either one of ρˆ0Z := (Iˆd + rZˆ)/2,
ρˆ1Z := (Iˆd − rZˆ)/2, and ρˆ0X := (Iˆd + rXˆ)/2, where
r = exp {−(θ/5.33)2/2)}, depending on the bit and basis
setting c ∈ C. Note that these I.I.D. properties are not
needed for the security proof, but they are assumed to
simulate the experimentally available data.
In the first simulation, we assume that Alice has a
single photon source in order to see the effect of the
PM error. In this case, the intensity of each pulse does
not fluctuate and δµ = 0, which leads to the tagging
probability of pt = δθ. The fraction of the number of
events where Bob obtains b ∈ {0, 1} given the setting
{c ∈ C,W ′ ∈ {Z,X}}, Qb|c,W ′ , is given by
Qb|c,W ′ = ηPr [b|ρˆc,W ′] (1− pd)
+ (1− η)pd(1− pd) + 1
2
{
ηpd + (1− η)p2d
}
, (D1)
where η denotes the overall transmittance,
Pr [b|ρˆc,W ′] := Tr[Pˆ (|bW ′〉)ρˆc] is the conditional
probability that Bob obtains b ∈ {0, 1} given that he
measures ρˆc in the W
′ basis, and pd is the dark count
rate of Bob’s detector. Here, η is written as η = ηchηB/2,
which is the product of the channel transmittance ηch,
the detection efficiency of Bob’s device ηB, and 1/2 of
the efficiency of Bob’s Mach-Zehnder interferometer.
The first (second) term in Eq. (D1) models a single click
at Bob’s side produced by a photon (dark count), while
the last term represents the simultaneous clicks. Note
that in this last case (simultaneous clicks), Bob assigns
a random bit value to the measurement outcome. The
gain in the Z basis Qdet|Z,Z is given by
Qdet|Z,Z = 1− (1− pd)2(1− η), (D2)
and the untagged-photon part Qu,det|Z,Z is lower
bounded by
Qu,det|Z,Z ≥ Q−u,det|Z,Z = Qdet|Z,Z − pt. (D3)
The upper bound on the phase error rate that originates
from the untagged states e+X,u is calculated from the fol-
lowing parameters:
Ydet|Z,Z,u ≥ Y −det|Z,Z,u =
Q−u,det|Z,Z
1− pt , (D4)
and
Qb|c,X − pt
1− pt ≤ Yb|c,X,u ≤
Qb|c,X
1− pt . (D5)
In addition, the bit error rate eZ is given by
eZ =
1
Qdet|Z,Z
(
1
2
Q1|0Z ,Z +
1
2
Q0|1Z ,Z
)
. (D6)
Finally, the asymptotic key generation rate R (per pulse)
is lower bounded by
R ≥ p2Z
{
Q−u,det|Z,Z
(
1− h(e+X,u)
)
−Qdet|Z,ZfECh(eZ)
}
,
(D7)
and the result is shown in FIG. 1 in the main text.
In the second simulation, Alice is assumed to have a
coherent source with both the PM and AM errors. The
gain in the Z basis is given by
Qdet|Z,Z,k =
∫ ∞
−∞
fG(µ|µ¯k, σk)
{
1− (1− pd)2e−µη
}
dµ,
(D8)
where fG(µ|µ¯k, σk) is the Gaussian distribution func-
tion which has the mean µ¯k and the standard devia-
tion σk = (µ
+
k − µ¯k)/5.33, and η is the overall transmit-
tance for a single photon. Here, exp (−µη) is the over-
all probability that a coherent light with intensity µ is
completely lost in the channel. Next, let pb,click|c,W ′,µ
be the conditional probability that the detector corre-
sponding to the outcome b ∈ {0, 1} clicks given that the
intensity of coherent state has been µ under the setting
{c ∈ C ∧W ′ ∈ {Z,X}}, which is given by
pb,click|c,W ′,µ = pd+(1−pd) {1− exp (−Pr [b|ρˆc,W ′]µη)} .
(D9)
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Therefore, the conditional probability that Bob obtains b
given the setting {c ∈ C ∧W ′ ∈ {Z,X} ∧ k ∈ K} is given
by
Qb|c,W ′,k
=
∫ ∞
−∞
fG(µ|µ¯k, σk)
{
pb,click|c,W ′,µ(1− pb¯,click|c,W ′,µ)
+
1
2
pb,click|c,W ′,µpb¯,click|c,W ′,µ
}
dµ, (D10)
where b¯ = 1(0) when b = 0(1). In addition, the bit error
rate eZ is given by
eZ =
1
Qdet|Z,Z,s
(
1
2
Q1|0Z ,Z,s +
1
2
Q0|1Z ,Z,s
)
. (D11)
